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Abstract: One of the most complex and uncertain areas of international legal
doctrine concerns how to deal with the aspiration of a people to achieve selfdetermination through the establishment of a new state and the related claim to
a specific territory over which statehood is to be exercised. Recently, when the
General Assembly of the United Nations referred to the International Court of
Justice the question of the legality of the declaration of independence by
Kosovar Albanians, the Court was given an opportunity to clarify and develop
the law on external self-determination. Instead, the Court answered extremely
narrowly, confining its analysis to the legality of the act of declaration without
determining any consideration of international legal norms applicable to the act
of secession that was being proposed. This article intends to fill the gap left by
the ICJ's decision: first by critiquing the inadequacy and tensions visible in the
existing doctrine and second by examining how recent developments in international law may allow for a more normatively coherent approach to the
problem.
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Introduction
How should international law deal with the aspiration of a people to achieve
self-determination through the establishment of a new state, and the related
claim to a specific territory over which statehood is to be exercised? This is one
of the most complex and uncertain areas of international legal doctrine, and
there is not even agreement on the full range of norms that are implicated in the
regulation of external self-determination. At the same time, issues raised for the
philosophy of international law are also complex, engaging such matters such
as the relationship of collective to individual rights, the problem of justifying
ethno-nationalism, and the meaning of democratic equality. Recently, when the
General Assembly of the United Nations referred to the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), the question of the legality of the declaration of and independence
by Kosovar Albanians, the Court was given an opportunity to clarify and develop
the law on external self-determination. Instead the Court answered extremely
narrowly, confining its analysis to the legality of the act of declaration itself (no
rule of international prohibits merely talking about independence, not surprisingly); the Court eschewed any consideration of international legal norms
applicable to the act of secession that was being proposed.
In a Separate Opinion one of the judges, Bruno Simma, chastised his
colleagues in strong terms for not taking up the challenge of a broader consideration of the international legal issues raised by the project of Kosovar
Albanian statehood. 2 According to Simma, "the General Assembly's request
deserves a more comprehensive answer, assessing both permissive and prohibitive rules of international law. This would have included a deeper analysis of
whether the principle of self-determination or any other rule (perhaps expressly
mentioning remedial secession) permit or even warrant independence (via
secession) of certain peoples/territories." 3 Simma implies, moreover, that international law may regulate external self-determination in ways other than
through permitting, prohibiting, or conferring a right to, external self-determi4
nation itself.
This article intends to take up Simma's plea for a "more comprehensive
answer" to what international law says about external self-determination and to
explore what would be required in order to provide such an answer, beginning
from a critique of the inadequacy and tensions visible in the existing doctrine
1
2
3
4

Kosovo Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. (July 22) para. 78-121.
Judge Bruno Simma, Separate Opinion to Kosovo Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. (July 22) para. 3.
Id. para. 7.
Id. para. 6.
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and then examining how recent developments in international law may allow
for a more normatively coherent approach to the problem.
Traditionally, for international lawyers, the problem of external self-determination was conceived of a struggle between an existing state - invoking the
inviolability of existing territorial boundaries as a supreme principle of international law - and a movement-seeking statehood, invoking the supposed right to
self-determination. The key moment in this struggle was seen as the decision of
the international community-other states-as to whether or not to recognize the
claim to statehood and thus to consecrate, as it were, the consequent disruption
of existing territorial boundaries.
Two devices were used to manage the tension between the principle of
inviolability of state boundaries and the right of self-determination. The first
was to limit external self-determination claims to de-colonization and to remediating oppression where no other means was available. The other was to
minimize disruption and instability from changes to existing territorial boundaries by using the principle of uti posseditis in the case of decolonization. This
meant that the former colonial administrative boundaries became the new
state's boundaries. By this means, one would in effect consecrate a successful
external self-determination movement, even if it achieved its goals by force and
did not have a legal claim to external self-determination, through "recognition"
of the new state within the territory claimed by the successful movement. In our
view, these devices not only entail the acceptance of considerable moral arbitrariness but also may well in fact lead to the exacerbation of violence, uncertainty, and instability.
We suggest that the reconceptualization of how international law is implicated in claims of external self-determination needs to be based on five interlocking notions.
First of all, greater clarity is required concerning the different moral bases of
claims for external self-determination in order to understand the full implications of each for international legal regulation.
Second, while most traditional international law approaches have focused
on the decision concerning the recognition of statehood as the decisive moment
for normative regulation by international law, we believe that a "comprehensive
answer" in Simma's sense means envisaging a continuum of international legal
regulation, beginning from the way in which the campaign for statehood is
waged and how it is responded to by the existing state and other groups and
extending through to the actual use of state power to accomplish the aspirations
for self-determination by the independence movement, once a new state has
come into being. The "right" to self-determination on this approach does not get
conceived as an entitlement at a given moment to be recognized by other states
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as an independent state, but rather is defined and limited through the regulation
by appropriate norms of all the internationally legally relevant steps that are
entailed in its realization.
Third, any right to external self-determination needs to be limited and
relativized in light of other relevant rights and obligations in international law.
Traditionally, to the extent that it might exist, the right to external self-determination was regarded as a trump card against a non-consenting existing state,
asserting its territorial integrity. There is however much more at stake than a
struggle between an existing state and a group within it that is seeking to form a
new state. The notion we have in mind here is succinctly and well expressed by
Jeremy Waldron: "self-determination is not the only principle in the constellation of political values recognized in international law; it must take its place
alongside other principles such as human rights, democracy, and the rule of
law."5 A claim to external self-determination by one group within an existing
state may seriously disrupt the entitlements and affect the interests of other
groups on that territory, and these may well be protected by international
human rights law, which encompasses civil and political but also social, economic, and cultural rights.
Fourth and closely connected to the second and third notions, international
law should operate in a normatively coherent manner in assigning legal burdens
and responsibilities to all the relevant actors involved in a situation where a
claim of external self-determination is asserted. This entails making both state
and non-state actors responsible for the way that violence and other coercive
actions (e.g. "ethnic cleansing") are used to either further or frustrate a claim of
self-determination. International law today is evolving so as to regulate internal
and external conflict, whether conducted by state or non-state actors, through a
framework combining elements of human rights, the law of war, and international criminal justice, what Teitel calls Humanity Law.6 This framework abhors
gaps in legal rights and responsibilities, especially concerning the protection of
persons and peoples.7 That a claim for external self-determination has resulted
in the recognition of the international community of statehood should not for
example excuse the independence movement and its members of responsibility
for acts committed prior to the achievement of statehood and the very same
should go for the existing state or other groups who may have fought against the
independence bid.
5 Jeremy Waldron, Two Conceptions of Self-determination, in THE
397 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010).
6 RUTH TEITEL, HUVANITY's LAW 105-06 (2011).

7 Id. at 106.

PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

DE GRUYTER

Regulation of External Self-determination

-

159

Finally, while decisions about statehood and recognition and related matters (such as United Nations membership) have as their locus political or
diplomatic institutions such as the UN Security Council, where only states are
directly represented and the positions asserted are based as much or more on
interests than on moral or legal principle, these and other statist institutions
(even the International Court of Justice) do not have full legitimacy for regulating the exercise of external self-determination; they are not open to the direct
participation of affected non-state actors in their deliberations, and especially
they do not provide a forum for the assertion of claims of rights-violation by the
victims nor the accountability of non-state actors. Political and diplomatic
institutions should not endorse the right to external self-determination in such
a way as to foreclose or prejudice the assertion of relevant claims and counterclaims in other more appropriate fora, regional human rights courts, for
example.
The article is organized as follows. We begin by briefly articulating the main
moral arguments that appear to underpin the claim to a right to external selfdetermination in international law, suggesting some of the challenges and
difficulties in the translation of these moral arguments into a workable international legal principle for the regulation of claims to external self-determination.
We then give a critical analysis of the way in which the question of external selfdetermination was addressed by the international legal system that emerged
after the end of the Second World War. After this we focus on more recent
attempts to address the question, in the context of the break-up of Yugoslavia
and of Quebec/Canada. In these more recent attempts, we can see the reflection,
to varying degrees, of the five notions posited above as central to what Simma
calls "a comprehensive answer."

The Moral Arguments that Underlie Claims for
External Self-determination in International Law
There are five kinds of moral argument that often underlie claims for external
self-determination in international law. The first and least controversial is the
argument against colonialism, the situation where the entire population or the
majority within a given territory is ruled without their consent by a foreign
power. 8 That self-rule is a justified response to such an injustice is not widely
8 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res.
1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16 U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
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disputed. Still even where the moral argument is undoubtedly very strong, it
does not automatically decide the nature of the entitlement to territory, for the
boundaries of the colony may themselves represent an injustice to other groups,
may have been drawn through mass displacement of persons, and so on. The
second argument is that of consent, the notion that the majority of the population in any defined area should be able to choose, through a convincing act of
collective will (usually a referendum) to exit the larger polity and govern itself as
a state within that defined area. 9 This argument is based on the notion that it is
inherently oppressive or unjust that any group of people should not be able to
choose to live in a separate political community apart from others with whom
they have previously shared a political community. It is an argument that
has been strongly urged by Quebec separatists in asserting the claim of external
self-determination.' 0 It has been equally urged against the Quebec separatists
by other groups, for example the Cree, who would not want to live in a state with
a majority Francophone Quebecois population." This demonstrates the problem
of almost infinite regress in this argument. It also illustrates the problem of
the group self-defining the territory or which they seek to exercise self-rule.
For the moral argument, even if compelling in the abstract, cannot itself establish an entitlement to any particular territory where the group might govern
themselves.
There are also two kinds of moral argument for remedial external selfdetermination, which are often blurred in international legal discourse. The
first is that where a group is denied internal self-determination, understood as
the right to full democratic participation based upon equality of citizenship,1 2 or
otherwise where the group is subject to persecution or oppression based on race
or ethnicity, and alternatives for addressing these rights violations have not
proven feasible, then it may be entitled to external self-determination as a
remedy. The idea here is to ensure that the rights of members of the group are

9 See, e.g., the principle of consent is a term used in the context of the Northern Ireland Peace
Process and one of the key points of the Good Friday Agreement.
10 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
11 Aboriginal Peoples and 1995 Quebec Referendum: A Survey of The Issues, sect. Al, available
at http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/researchpublications/bp412-e.htm#l.
12 The logic here could extend intentional discrimination and persecution of a particular group
to situations where, because the various groups in question have such great differences, or
distrust between them goes extremely deep, it is simply impossible for them to effectively
participate together in effective common institutions of democratic self-government. In other
words, there is a de facto frustration of the exercise of the right to self-determination. We are
grateful to Tom Nagel in particular for urging us to reflect on this kind of circumstance and
whether it could lead to a morally justified claim to external self-determination.
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protected into the future and it seems only a state where they are the majority
population can achieve this. But the moral argument does not really ground a
claim to any particular territory, although it at least implies that the territorial
settlement should be such as to minimize the chances of future persecution.
The other meaning of remedial external self-determination is backward
rather than forward looking: The right to statehood is granted in response to
some past injustice done to the group or its members (dispossession of land,
etc.). This argument based on historical injustice also risks a kind of infinite
regress, essentially opening up the injustices that may have been done to or
between various groups through territorial settlements based on war, population
displacement, natural catastrophes, and so forth over centuries. It raises issues
of intergenerational justice and the rights of third parties who may have
acquired an (arguably) innocent interest in the territory in question or certain
defined rights on it. More generally, that a historical injustice has been done to a
group and/or its members in itself does not make statehood morally compelling
as the default remedy.
Finally, there is a moral argument that has an ethno-nationalist flavor to it,
although often articulated particularly by philosophers sympathetic to it, such
as Will Kymlicka'3 and David Miller,'" in more general terms. There is a certain
kind of group identity - Kymlicka calls it "culture"" but it could be based on
religion or language or a shared ethnicity, that is a special good or value, which
cannot be adequately protected without the group or its leaders having the
ability to exercise collective power over a defined territory. Some versions of
this argument cash out in terms of a case for forms of political autonomy that
fall short of statehood, aboriginal self-government for instance in the Canadian
case.' 6 Whether and why this kind of group identity or affiliation is a good or
value is a significant philosophical issue. At the same time, when this kind of
moral argument is made it is often couched in terms of a claim over the group's
traditional homeland, and thus the notion that the preservation and promotion
of its identity is connected to control of a specific territory. Without fully
rehearsing the philosophical debates here between different kinds of liberals,
communitarians, and nationalists, the translation of this kind of argument into
international legal principle raises a number of difficulties. The first is that more
than one group may have a plausible claim that a certain given territory is an

13

See,

e.g., MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A NEW THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS

(1995).

14 DAVID MILLER, ON NATIONALITY (1995).
15 MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, Supra note 13.

16 See Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 10; see ALAN CAIRNS, CITIZENS PLUS: ABORIGINAL
PEOPLES AND THE CANADIAN STATE 40-42 (2000).
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essential part of their homeland - in such an instance one would need recourse
to a range of additional principles in order to decide how to reconcile or
adjudicate between the competing claims of external self-determination of the
two or more groups. A second difficulty, less noticed but perhaps even more
important, is that the exercise of collective power to preserve or promote the
identity of a particular group or people may be in inherent tension with other
values protected by international law, including individual freedom not to conform to group customs and traditions, equality of citizenship (which it should be
recalled is fundamental to international law's conception of internal self-determination), and the rights of minorities. This is why great caution must be
exercised in recognizing in international law any force to the argument for
external self-determination based on the idea that the exercise of state power
is necessary and desirable to favor the preservation of a particular group or
people's distinctive identity. As we shall discuss later in this article, there is
already case law under international law that illustrates the tension in question.
A third difficulty is that the argument often assumes that collective identity
understood as something like culture or ethnicity or language is unitary,
whereas there may be multiple allegiances, affiliations, or collective aspects of
identity that are quite properly protected under international law, for example,
gender, disability, and arguably to an increasing extent sexual orientation. It is
really not possible or desirable to organize a state around the expression of
these other kinds of collective allegiance or identity, but this does not mean that
they should take lower priority as a matter of international legal principle nor
that they can ignored in translating the ethno-national moral argument into
international legal principle. For example, in the case of aboriginal self-government in Canada, aboriginal women did not identify with the project of selfgovernment in the same way as aboriginal men; indeed, they saw aspects of that
project as threatening to their collective gender identity.' In international law,
self-determination is a right of "peoples"'" but what a people is remains
undefined: there is a real danger of allowing ethno-nationalist conceptions of
collective identity filling this gap and crowding out or subordinating other
aspects of collective identity or affiliation that may be relevant to aspects of
self-determination or collective rights even if they are not a basis for claims to
statehood.

17 Elizabeth A. Asante, Negotiating Identity: Aboriginal Woman and the Politics of SelfGovernment, 25 CAN. J. NATIVE STUD. 1 (2005).
18 International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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The Post-War International Legal System: The
Struggle between Self-determination and
Territorial Integrity
Writing in the early 1960s, the Jewish-German 6migr6 philosopher Leo Strauss
made the provocative suggestion that the post-war, UN-Charter-based system of
international law was premised on a "pious fraud." By requiring respect for
existing state boundaries but also endorsing the self-determination of peoples,
Strauss intimated, the system had to commit itself to "the assumption that all
present boundaries are just, i.e. in accordance with the self-determination of
peoples but this assumption is a pious fraud of which the fraudulence is more
evident than the piety."' 9
Strauss here reveals only part of the "fraud." The post-war, UN-Charterbased system did not fundamentally alter the doctrine of recognition of new
states (or more precisely resolve the ambiguities in that doctrine). Thus, on the
one hand, one was called to respect existing territorial boundaries but on the
other if a self-determination movement was effectively able to change the "facts
on the ground" concerning the control of territory, it had a significant chance of
gaining recognition of the "breakaway state." Thus while normatively consecrating existing state boundaries, international law also permitted existing states to
recognize new states, based on de facto considerations such as the presence of
government and territorial control. Thus, international law, although claiming
stability of existing borders as a fundamental ordering principle, rewarded the
unilateral disruption of those very boundaries by separatist movements, where
successful on the ground. Once recognized as a state, the independence movement in control of a given territory would itself be entitled to the protection of
the prohibition on the use force against its "territory," as well as the right of selfdefense, i.e. the right to use force against any attempt to resist its secession by
the state from which it was breaking away. But, at the same time, and in obvious
tension with the acceptance of recognition as Machtpolitik, the evolution of
international human rights has given rise to the expectation that the right to
self-determination would express and conform to the conception of human
freedom, equality, and security at the normative core of human rights.
The history of post-war international legal practice bears witness to numerous attempts to rescue the global juridical order from the "pious fraud" (partly)
identified by Strauss, reconciling self-determination as a normative ideal with

19

LEO STRAUSs, THE CITY AND MAN

(1963), see especially Introduction.
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territorial sovereignty, the prerogative of state recognition, and more recently,
human rights.

Decolonization
The UN instruments on decolonization represent the first major effort to reconcile the ideal of self-determination and the principle of stable territorial integrity.
The 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples,2 0 without defining the meaning of a "people," states that "all peoples
have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right, they freely determine
their political status and pursue their economic, social and cultural development." 2 ' The Declaration further states: "All armed action or repressive measures
of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable
them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and
the integrity of their national territory shall be respected." 2 2 But at the same
time: "Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity
and the territorial of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles
23
of the United Nations..."
The solution to the reconciliation of the principles enunciated in paragraphs
1 and 4 with that enunciated in paragraph 6 is, of course, notorious: uti
posseditis. The assertion of the right to self-determination and "complete independence" in paragraphs 1 and 4 was conditioned on the newly independent
states having the same boundaries as the administrative boundaries that existed
under colonialism. In this way, independence could be reconciled with stable
territorial sovereignty. But of course these boundaries did not correspond, not
even roughly, to the territorial patterns of organized political, social, economic,
and cultural life prior to colonization: thus how could the imposition of uti
possedetis, the denial of the freedom to choose a different pattern, really be
compatible with the free determination of political status and economic, social,
and cultural development?
Uti possedetis is most often justified as necessary to prevent the outbreak of
violent conflict over territory in the process of decolonization. But as we have
seen, most dramatically in parts of Africa, the result has often been the opposite.
20 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, supra
note 8, at para. 1.
21 Id. para. 4.
22 Id. para. 6.
23 Id.
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More cynically, uti possedetis had the advantage to the former colonial powers of
extending colonial domination beyond formal decolonization through preserving a territorial configuration whose only basis for internal unity was often the
economic, political, and administrative relationship to the colonial power.
Boundaries in important ways determine the challenges of governance: the
kind of infrastructure necessary for a national political economy (transportation,
utilities, education, etc.) and the kind of differences (linguistic, cultural, religious) have to be managed in order to have a sustainable and just polity. Giving
peoples independence from colonial rule while saddling them with whatever
boundaries were created through the original (putatively unjust) colonial practices, regardless of the impact on the challenges of governance, was arguably a
perpetuation rather than a solution to the "pious fraud" referred to by Leo
Strauss.
The defenders or apologists of uti possedetis would point out that no one
seemed to have a viable plan for restoring the territorial patterns of political,
economic, social, and cultural life prior to colonization; nor would that have
been, either, necessarily just given that the effects of colonization might well
have rendered such patterns no longer viable in many cases. And even if
disrupting those patterns through violent colonial conquest could be understood
as unjust, this would not make the original patterns just; these patterns might in
themselves be intertwined with injustices, or what we would now judge to be
injustices, other than and prior to those of colonialism; therefore their simple
restoration (even if viable under contemporary conditions) would not, even in
the abstract, be a simply just remedy.

Self-determination as Democratic Equality:
The Declaration on Friendly Relations
One could produce a certain normative clarity or at least honesty, transcending
"pious fraud," through explicitly accepting (1) that any particular division of the
world into territorial units defined as states will have strong elements of arbitrariness, will likely be shaped by past injustices, and there is no obvious
normative principle that would inform judgment on and revision of borders,
allowing a decision between the competing claims and historical narratives of
different groups; (2) that the division of the world into territorial states and the
protection of territorial integrity of those states is a necessary if not foundational
building block of an international legal order; (3) that to the extent possible
within the confines of such an international order one should encourage and
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support the mitigation or remedy of any injustices that might result from or be
exacerbated by such an arbitrary division of the world (whether inequality of
resources, or vulnerability or persecution of minorities, to give but two
examples).
How then to make sense of the idea of a legal entitlement of peoples to selfdetermination of peoples? The answer apparently given in the 1970 UN
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations 24 is that self-determination really means democratic equality. A "people" is just the collection of individuals that one finds within the territory of any
given existing state: the entitlement to self-determination of this "people." Thus
according to the 1970 Declaration, the right to self-determination is apparently
fulfilled where a state "is possessed of a government representing the whole
people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or color." 2 5
It is true that the opening paragraph of the Declaration seems to suggest a rather
different normative thrust to the right to self-determination in stating that "the
establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or
integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political
status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right
of self-determination..." 2 6 (emphasis added). But this is "not to be construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair totally
or in part the territorial integrity or political unity"2 7 of an existing state.
What the Declaration does leave open is the possible legality or legitimacy of
modes of realizing self-determination that do entail disrupting existing territorial
state boundaries in the case where that existing state denies democratic equality,
i.e. a "government representing the whole people belonging to the territory
without distinction as to race, creed, and color." 2 8 "External" self-determination
thus becomes a legal remedy: the consequences, as suggested in the Declaration
are that the state denying democratic equality cannot forcibly resist the selfdetermination attempt even if it entails dismemberment of that state, and also
that, legally, other states can come to the aid of the self-determination
movement.

24 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, U.N. Doc A/RES/25/
2625 (1970), preamble [hereinafter Declaration on Principles of International Law].
25 Id. art. 1.
26 Id. Emphasis added.
27 Id.
28 Id.
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The acceptance of external self-determination as a remedy for the denial of
democratic equality would seem to indicate a major qualification on the principle of territorial integrity of existing states, and indeed one based on an ideal of
internal political justice. It is hard to imagine such a counter-Westphalian
development except in light of the emergence of human rights as a shaping
and indeed transformative force in international law. Yet in international legal
practice it was already foreshadowed by the hint in the Report of the League of
Nations Commission on the Aland Islands question 2 9 that "oppression" might be
one of the rare or only justification(s) for secession and in political theory by, for
example, purely political Zionism, which had as its basis the notion that independent statehood is a solution - in a world of sovereign states perhaps the only
solution - to the problem of persistent discrimination or persecution, to the
denial of democratic equality, either formally or as a matter of social fact, or
both.
But original political Zionism was philosophically consistent in recognizing
discrimination or persecution might generate a valid claim to statehood by a
persecuted group but not necessarily a claim that trumped that of any counterclaims of other inhabitants, to any given territory. Thus, original political
Zionism generated any number of proposals for possible territories on which a
Jewish homeland might be established, including for example what is today
Uganda. Herzl, the founder of political Zionism, wrote: "We are one people - our
enemies have made us one without our consent."3 0
By accepting the principle that the denial of democratic equality by a
government of all the people in a given territory gives a persecuted or discriminated group within that territory a legal remedy of external self-determination,
the 1970 UN Declaration indirectly or subtly introduces an additional or second
meaning to "people" - a "nation" in Herzl's sense, as defined by the persecution
or discrimination in question.
Fatefully, the Declaration, while opening up the possibility of external selfdetermination, provides no principle for determining over what territory such a
right might be exercised. Does the remedy simply trump any rights or claims of
other inhabitants of such a territory? This occurs when the remedy for the denial
of democratic remedy is no longer a remedy exercised by the entire people on
the territory of the state in question, i.e. the replacement of the government of
that people as a whole with a government that respects democratic equality, an
ancestral homeland, for example, or part of the territory of the existing state

29 The Aaland Islands Question (On Jurisdiction), Report of the International Committee of
Jurists, League of Nations Official Journal, P.C.I.J. Special Supplement No. 3 (1920) (ser. x) No. x.

30

THEODOR HERZL, THE JEWISH STATE

(1896).
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where they constitute a majority. As noted above, in our discussion of the moral
arguments, one aspect of the difficulty is that the remedy of external selfdetermination is only available to groups who are organized in such a way as
to be able to stake a claim to some territory or other. Where the people who are
denied democratic equality do not have some sort of claim to an identifiable,
bounded territory, they must content themselves with other remedies, either
changing the practices of the government of the existing state or exit (immigration to another state where they are not denied democratic equality).
The 1970 Declaration, encouraged territorial claims based on extrinsic normative principles, including ethnic or even racist ideologies or historical narratives, which connect people to territory based on "blood and belonging." 3 ' Of
course, as we know there are often counter-ideologies or counter-narratives of
other groups, in contestations over the same or overlapping territory. Yet, there
are no adequate principles intrinsic to the right of self-determination itself by
which such competing claims to territory could be decided or mediated.
The possibility of international law being co-opted by ethno-nationalism 32 is
further increased by indeterminacy in the content of the idea of democratic
equality or more precisely "a government representing the whole people belonging to a territory without distinction as to race, creed or color." 33 For the moral
argument concerning a remedy for discrimination or persecution can be combined or conflated with the different moral argument about the need to exercise
collective power to protect a particular group identity or "culture." As noted
earlier, philosophers such as Will Kymlicka have suggested that group identity
or cultural context are themselves vital goods, on which meaningful individual
freedom or autonomy depends, and that this may be the basis for some entitlement to the exercise by a group of self-government or a measure of political
autonomy over a given territory. In this regard, Kymlicka quotes approvingly a
proposal for a European minority rights convention that would provide that
"persons belong to a national minority shall have the right to have at their

31 Declaration on Principles of International Law, preamble, supra note 24.
32 We use ethno-nationalism in a broad sense here to denote in Miller's sense the idea of a
"people" as having a "distinct, common character of its own," a shared identity makes it a
"nation," and the notion that "every nation must have a homeland," taken together. The
"distinct common character" could be based on religious, ethnic, linguistic, racial, or historical
notions as long as they play an exclusionist, particularist identity-forming function. See DAVID
MILLER, ON NATIONALITY 25 (1995).
33 Declaration on Principles of International Law, preamble, supra note 24.
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disposal appropriate local or autonomous authorities or to have a special status,
matching this specific historical and territorial situation...."" At first glance, this
would seem to go beyond the entitlement to a government that represents the
entire people without distinction as to race, creed, or color. But does a government "represent the entire people" if it provides for instance public funding for
education only in the majority language or provides publicly funded schools
where the majority religion is taught but not minority religions? What about
where, because of majoritarianism or through application of the formal equality
principle of "one person, one vote," only members of the majority ethnic group
are elected to public office, i.e. because of the individual or private preferences
of those belonging to the majority group to be governed by "their own" not do to
governmental discrimination as such? If majoritarianism itself tends to preclude
representing the entire people in the normatively meaningful sense, then democratic equality itself could be interpreted as implying a right of minorities to
some kind of political autonomy or "special status" within a certain territory, the
denial of which could then, in turn, be considered to provide a basis for external
self-determination. The problem here is not solved but rather arguably only
exacerbated by the broad terms in which minority rights are defined in Article
27 of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Badinter and the Balkans
The break-up of Yugoslavia gave rise to new efforts to recast the structure of
international legal normativity as it applies to self-determination and secession.
One sees here the emergence, albeit very imperfectly and unevenly, of some of
the central notions that, we have suggested, should govern a comprehensive
approach to external self-determination under international law. On the other
hand, some of the efforts in question, especially the Badinter Commission,
tended to obscure or avoid a direct consideration of the moral arguments for
external self-determination and their suitability for informing international legal
principle.
First, there was an acknowledgement, at least in Europe, that the right to
external self-determination is not a "trump" that overrides or displaces other
relevant international legal norms: the third notion that we argue should govern

34 Will Kymlicka, Minority Rights in Political Philosophy and International Law, in
PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 377, 383 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010).
35 UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 27, Mar. 23, 1976, 14668 U.N.T.S. 172.
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any "comprehensive answer." Instead the right to external self-determination is
properly conditioned on these norms (the second of our five notions). By setting
up a framework for recognition of statehood that contained a significant number
of human rights conditionalities, the European Union appeared to be boldly
challenging the gap between the aspiration of international law to regulate
normatively self-determination and secession and the reality of the consecration
of rapports de force through the doctrine of recognition. The European Union's
guidelines were based on the premise - radical and progressive - that this gap
must be closed. This is an expression, at least partial, of the second notion in
our approach that of a continuum of international legal regulation.
In the Guidelines, the EU affirmed its "attachment to ... the principle of selfdetermination."3 6 This principle governed the recognition of new states provided
these states respected "the rule of law, democracy and human rights" and
provided "guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities."3 7 But, in addition, the EU also required as a condition for recognition
"respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by
peaceful means and by common agreement." 3 8 Further, "The Community and
its member States will not recognize entities which are the result of
aggression.
The secessionist movement might even have been driven by ethnic nationalism, it might have engaged in violent struggle against other groups, but it
would still have the possibility of recognition provided that the resulting state
committed itself to democracy, human rights, and some version of multiculturalism (a further declaration on Yugoslaviao envisaged as an condition for
recognition adhesion to a new legal instrument on minority rights, which
never in the event came into existence). One of course must be careful to
underline that the EC Guidelines did not suggest that under the international
law of self-determination, there was a requirement that existing states confer
recognition: recognition remained within the discretion of existing states. But
such discretion could be exercised legitimately and in conformity with international law principles, where the independence movement representing the
future state made the required human rights commitments.

36 European Communities Declaration on the "Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union," Dec. 16, 1991.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Declaration on Yugoslavia, Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, Dec. 16, 1991.
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How could this be reconciled with "respect for inviolability of all frontiers"?
In order to avoid having to directly confront the moral arguments for external
self-determination at issue and the question of how they translate into legal
principle, the Commission interpreted the course of events in Yugoslavia in such
a way that it could present the trigger for recognition as something other than
unilateral secession. Thus, the Commission interpreted the various events engendered by the secessionist movements, such as plebiscites in favor of independence in the republics, the breakdown in the functioning of the institutions of
federal of governance in Yugoslavia, and the state of war itself, as the "process
of dissolution" of Yugoslavia as a federal state.
In applying the criteria for recognition in the Guidelines and the
Declaration, the Badinter Commission could make it appear as though it was
simply responding to the challenge of an orderly state succession, in the circumstances of the failure or collapse of Yugoslavia. It could avoid the implication of
legitimizing secession and consecrating its territorial consequences. While
claiming to make a purely factual determination of the failure or dissolution of
the Yugoslav federal state, the Badinter Commission shuttled between facts and
norms in order to hide its true game. 4 ' Thus, while purporting to make a purely
factual determination about the "process of dissolution," the Commission introduced indirectly normative considerations that would affect a judgment on the
legitimacy of secession: i.e. criteria that would be relevant to judging the
legitimacy of secession - evidence of popular support for independence and
whether federal institutions still allowed for adequate representativeness and
participation. The moral arguments from consent and based on remediation of
discrimination were given international legal consequences indirectly,
without an explicit affirmation of their normative weight or an analysis of
exactly how they can or should be translated into legal principle. Thus our
first notion, the need for clarity concerning the moral arguments underpinning
the claim for a right to external self-determination and the challenge of translating them into legal principle, was not well-reflected in the Badinter
Commission's opinions.
The Commission was faced with the difficulty the guidelines posed with
respect to the demand for territorial stability. Did recognition imply accepting
whatever territory the independence movement controlled at the moment at
which recognition was determined? Avoiding the implications of such a con-

41 Peter Radan, Post-Secession InternationalBorders: A Critical Analysis of the Opinions of the
BadinterArbitration Commission, 24 (1) MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 50 (2000).
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secration of rapports de force, the Commission pulled out of a hat uti possedetis.42 In a novel doctrinal move (uti possedetis had only clearly been recognized
as valid law with respect to former colonial boundaries in the context of
decolonization4 3 ), the Commission stated that uti possedetis would apply in
such a way that recognition would be based on each of the independence
movements being entitled to the territory of the federal sub-unit in which that
movement was based.
No more, no less, regardless of any normative or
practical considerations. The internal federal boundaries of Yugoslavia would
be the boundaries of the newly recognized states. (Opinions 2 and 3) Serbs and
Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina (and Croats in Serbia) would be entitled to minority rights but nothing more. To legitimize the choice of uti possedetis here the
Commission pointed not only to the need for territorial stability and the avoidance of violent struggle over borders, but in a subtle and almost under the
surface way to the confederal (and ethno-nationalist) notion that Yugoslavia was
composed by republican "entities"; a federal state is "made up of a number of
separate entities."4 5
The idea here is that the natural or original political community is an entity
based upon a single people or an ethnic or national majority; the federation is a
composite or derivative political community. Thus, it is no surprise that where
these "entities" no longer wish to operate together a federal state, the federation
would dissolve into separate states created out of these entities. But of course
this is hardly the only theory of a federal polity. We point out only that an
important judgment of normative political theory is embedded in what the
Commission presents as a statement of obvious facts.4 If the republics were
seen as mere administrative districts in an authoritarian state held together by a
single political party and its various sociological emanations, then one would
have to question the legitimacy of basing statehood on those boundaries;
indeed, one might be inclined to the conclusion that the secessionist movements
in the republics that were engineered by the various political elites were depriving the Yugoslav people of self-determination - the ability to decide together a
post-communist - and perhaps even post-ethno-nationalist future. Thus, very

42 Opinion No 3 of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, Jan. 11,
1992, 31 ILM 1499 [hereinafter Opinion No 3].
43 See Case Concerning the TerritorialDispute [1994] JCJ Rep 6, 89 (Ajibola J.), cited in Radan,
supra note 41, at n.60.
44 Opinion No. 3, supra note 42.
45 Opinion No. 8, July 1992 (Completing the process of the dissolution of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)).
46 For a critique of the pact theory, see Robert Howse & Karen Knop, Federalism, Secession,
and the Limits of Ethnic Accommodation, 1 NEw EUR. L. REV. 269 (1992-1993).
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indirectly the Commission acquiesced to elements of the ethno-nationalist moral
argument for self-determination.
There were at least three respects in which the Badinter Opinions, and the
Guidelines and Declaration they were interpreting, created perverse incentives,
rewarding "ethnic cleansing." First of all, the requirement of uti possedetis
having eliminated the possibility of adjusting borders to the ethno-national
ideologies of the various political groups, the obvious alternative was to
"adjust" the population within the borders of each of the entities to the demands
of these ideologies.
Second, in requiring very extensive protection of minority rights, and
respect for non-discrimination, the criteria applied by the Badinter Commision
would make it difficult for the dominant political group within each entity to
operate the state as an expression of ethno-nationalist ideology, as long as
significant minority populations remained within their territory. This made it
desirable for the ethno-nationalist majority to encourage those populations to
leave and return to their own "homeland," so that the majority would have a
freer hand to exercise collective power in the service of group identity.
Third, the Commission opined that the members of minority groups in the
newly recognized states had a right to choose their "nationality."4 7 The
Commission drew out the implications of this only obscurely, one of them
being that it might be possible for Bosnian Serbs to choose to be nationals of
Serbia (assuming Serbia agreed). They had a national homeland in Serbia to
which they could choose to belong. Why then should not the majority in Bosnia
"encourage" them to make this choice?
Finally, in determining on the one hand that minorities within the territory
of each of the former republics - the newly recognized states - would be entitled
to a wide range of minority rights, and on the other hand that no changes in
boundaries could be contemplated, the Badinter Commission was silent on the
remedies available if the newly recognized states refused to respect the human
and minority rights of the minorities: In that one case, would secession be still
available as a remedy, or would the principle of inviolability of post-independence frontiers preclude even remedial secession? Again here we see a lack of
clarity about the nature of the moral arguments and what is required to translate
them into legal principle.
But these difficulties in the Badinter approach may have ultimately led in
later phases of the Balkans conflict to a stronger reflection of some of the other
central notions we believe are needed for a comprehensive approach to the
international legal regulation of external self-determination. The establishment
47 Opinion 3, supra note 42.

174 -

R. Howse and R. Teitel

DE GRUYTER

of an international criminal tribunal led to criminal responsibility for many acts
of violence committed in the struggle for self-determination in the Balkans,
responsibility applying to non-state as well as state actors and to internal as
well as external aspects of the conflict.4 8 This is perhaps the strongest expression yet of the fourth notion, which is that all the actors, state and non-state
should be international legally responsible for their conduct through the process
of asserting the claim to external self-determination and responding to it. It is
also a reflection of our second notion that the right to external self-determination must be defined in relation to other international legal norms and not trump
them, and the third notion of a continuum of legal regulation-ethnic cleansing
and related acts of persecution have be deployed as means in the struggle for
external self-determination, and also in the exercise of it, once statehood has
been achieved.
The prohibition on ethnic cleansing implies a hard limit on the ethnonationalist moral argument for external self-determination or at least a hard
limit on its translation into international legal principle. Ultimately, the logic of
that prohibition is that a group exercising external self-determination as the
controlling majority within a state is considerably limited in the tools that it can
use, consistent with international law, to assure that the demographics remain
in its favor: i.e. that the group remains a numerical majority in the state and is
thus able to ensure that its institutions and policies reflect and preserve the
collective identity in question. In other words, that group cannot engage in
coercive policies, at the very least actual forcible expulsion, to reduce the
presence of members of other groups on the territory of the state in question.
While the jurisprudence of the ICTY suggests that forcible expulsion or removal
of a population group is criminally prohibited under international law,49 it is
arguable that many actions that fall short of forcible removal, but which involve
the intimidation of such groups or reducing their legal protections in such a way
as to make it practically impossible for them to live as equal citizens in the state
in question, would also amount to prohibited "ethnic cleansing." Thus under the
statute of the International Criminal Court, whose provisions were deeply influenced by criminal justice in the Balkans, among the list of criminal offenses over
which the Court has jurisdiction are "inhumane" acts including persecution,
"the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to inter50
national law or by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity."

48 This is developed at length in TEITEL, supra note 6, chs. 4 and 5.
49 See Prosecutor v. Krstit, Case No IT-98-33-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, Aug. 2, 2001.
50 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 2 (g), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
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But the tension here may not only be with the ethno-nationalist moral
argument. For the remedial argument as well assumes that a group needs to
have its "own" state in order to counter adequately discrimination or persecution. If some other group becomes the governing majority, if only through
demographic change, then the risks of discrimination or persecution in theory
are revived; and yet, again, actively countering such a change may well run
afoul of other international legal norms.
Finally, the Balkans conflict also saw an eventual expression of our related
fifth notion that political and diplomatic institutions should not be allowed to
foreclose or prejudge claims of persons and peoples who lack standing before
those state-dominated institutions, leaving space for other fora to vindicate such
international legal claims. This is most clearly illustrated in European Court of
Human Rights case of Sedjit and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzogovina.5 ' According to
the Constitution of Bosnia (originating in the Dayton Accord), the applicants
before the ECHR, who were of Roma and Jewish origin, were ineligible to stand
for election to the House of Peoples of Bosnia (the second chamber of the State
parliament) and to the Presidency (the collective Head of State).5 2 Eligibility for
either office required affiliation with a "constituent people" of Bosnia (Serb,
Croat or Muslim).5 3 Finding a violation of the equality provisions of the
European Convention on Human Rights, the Court held:
Racial discrimination is a particularly egregious kind of discrimination and, in view of its
perilous consequences, requires from the authorities special vigilance.... It is for this
reason that the authorities must use all available means to combat racism, thereby
reinforcing democracy's vision of a society in which diversity is not perceived as a threat
but as a source of enrichment.

The Court found that the need for power-sharing as part of the political settlement in Bosnia was not "an objective and reasonable justification" for the
discriminatory policy because power sharing could be achieved without the
"total exclusion of representatives of the other communities." 5 4
One cannot underestimate the significance of the Court's decision here for
the approach we advocate to the international legal regulation of external selfdetermination. The international community decided to deny to each of the main
groups within Bosnia the right of external self-determination, a decision already

51
Ct.
52
53
54

Sejdit and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina: Applications nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06, Eur.
H.R. (Dec. 22, 2009), Grand Chamber judgment.
Id. para. 9.
Id. at 3, para. 7.
Id. paras. 43, 50, and 48.
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predetermined by the endorsement of uti possedetis by the Badinter Commission.
Instead, each group was granted vested collective rights in the governance of the
composite state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The European Court of Human Rights
rejected the notion of the arrangement as a final settlement of the claims in
question, fully subjecting it to generally applicable human rights norms. In other
words, any aspect of a political agreed solution with respect to the exercise of
the right to self-determination is reviewable against such human rights norms ex
post, at the behest of affected individuals or groups.
But the Sejdic and Finci case also has important implications for translation
of the moral argument for self-determination on ethno-nationalist lines into
international legal principle. The Court's understanding of democratic equality,
i.e. of non-discrimination in political participation, essentially ruled out the
possibility of reserving political offices to individuals identifying with particular
ethno-national groups. Its approach thus raises the question of whether there is
an intrinsic incompatibility between international human rights norms of a
fundamental character and the idea that the exercise of collective power by
representatives of a particular ethno-nationalist group is a legitimate aim of
external self-determination.

Quebec: The Supreme Court of Canada Opinion
on Secession
In a reference opinion, the Supreme Court of Canada considered whether, under
the Canadian constitution and under international law, the province of Quebec
had a right of unilateral secession from Canada. 5 The Court's articulation of its
understanding of democracy and peoplehood within a federal state encompassing different linguistic and ethnic groups is relevant to the meaning of external
self-determination in international law, even though it occurs in the part of the
ruling dealing with Canadian constitutional law.
The Court summarized its approach under the Constitution as follows:
The Court in this Reference is required to consider whether Quebec has a right to unilateral
secession. Arguments in support of the existence of such a right were primarily based on
the principle of democracy. Democracy, however, means more than simple majority rule.
Constitutional jurisprudence shows that democracy exists in the larger context of other
constitutional values. Since Confederation, the people of the provinces and territories have
created close ties of interdependence (economic, social, political and cultural) based on
55 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
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shared values that include federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law,
and respect for minorities. A democratic decision of Quebecers in favor of secession would
put those relationships at risk. The Constitution vouchsafes order and stability, and
accordingly secession of a province "under the Constitution" could not be achieved
unilaterally, that is, without principled negotiation with other participants in
56
Confederation within the existing constitutional framework.

The Court further opined:
Quebec could not, despite a clear referendum result, purport to invoke a right of selfdetermination to dictate the terms of a proposed secession to the other parties to the
federation. The democratic vote, by however strong a majority, would have no legal effect
on its own and could not push aside the principles of federalism and the rule of law, the
rights of individuals and minorities, or the operation of democracy in the other provinces
or in Canada as a whole. Democratic rights under the Constitution cannot be divorced from
constitutional obligations. Nor, however, can the reverse proposition be accepted: the
continued existence and operation of the Canadian constitutional order could not be
indifferent to a clear expression of a clear majority of Quebecers that they no longer
wish to remain in Canada. The other provinces and the federal government would have
no basis to deny the right of the government of Quebec to pursue secession should a clear
majority of the people of Quebec choose that goal, so long as in doing so, Quebec respects
the rights of others. The negotiations that followed such a vote would address the potential
act of secession as well as its possible terms should in fact secession proceed. There would
be no conclusions predetermined by law on any issue. Negotiations would need to address
the interests of the other provinces, the federal government and Quebec and indeed the
rights of all Canadians both within and outside Quebec, and specifically the rights of
minorities.
The negotiation process would require the reconciliation of various rights and obligations by negotiation between two legitimate majorities, namely, the majority of the population of Quebec, and that of Canada as a whole. A political majority at either level that
does not act in accordance with the underlying constitutional principles puts at risk the
legitimacy of its exercise of its rights, and the ultimate acceptance of the result by the
57
international community.

It will be noticed here that the Supreme Court of Canada gives some weight (as
does the Badinter Commission albeit under the guise, as we argued, of making a
purely factual determination) to the moral argument from consent. But the Court
also has a clear sense of the difficulty with translating that moral argument into
a legal entitlement to external self-determination: the need to respect the rights
of others, with whom the group in question has shared a political and legal
community on the territory in question.

56 Id.
57 Id. (2) Question 1.
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Second, contrary to the Badinter Commission, the Canadian Court chooses
to view the expression of popular will in favor of independence not as a stage in
the dissolution of the federal state but rather as triggering a negotiation with the
people of the country as a whole as represented by the federal level of government. The Court does not view Canada as a union of peoples or provincial
"entities": thus it speaks of a Canadian as well as a Quebec "political majority."
One can of course explain the differences in terms of the different factual
circumstances. Given that the Yugoslav federal state was controlled by an
authoritarian one-party government, could one speak of a political majority of
the Yugoslav people as a whole, other than in connection with the hope of a
democratic post-Communist transition for Yugoslavia as a whole? Further, in its
constitutional analysis, the Canadian Supreme Court did not exclude "boundary
issues" from the many and complex questions that would need to be resolved by
negotiations within the framework of the rule of law. Thus, it by no means
endorsed the validity of the existing provincial boundaries as a basis for secession or dismemberment of the country in accordance with the principles of
democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, federalism and protection of
minorities. Finally, the Court viewed the conformity of the negotiations over
secession with the constitutional principles as non-justiciable; here one needed
to rely on the political actors to protect constitutional values. But the Court
observed, "the legality of the acts of the parties to the negotiation process under
Canadian law, and the perceived legitimacy of such action, would be important
58
considerations in the recognition process."
The court thus assumed that, at the international level, recognition could
depend on the legitimacy of the process of secession; that this legitimacy would
in part be evaluated as against the standards of the Canadian constitutional
order itself. By contrast the Badinter Commission's conception of recognition as
flowing from "dissolution" of a federal state suggests that secessionist movements have every incentive to break down the rule the law, using methods that
render the institutions of the federation and indeed the federal level of governance itself as non-functional, so as to be able to provoke a verdict of "dissolution" that allows recognition of the seceding state within the boundaries
established by the constitution of the federal union.
This brings us to the international legal analysis proper of the Canadian
Supreme Court. The Court opined:
International law contains neither a right of unilateral secession nor the explicit denial of
such a right, although such a denial is, to some extent, implicit in the exceptional

58 Id. para. 103.
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circumstances required for secession to be permitted under the right of a people to selfdetermination, e.g., the right of secession that arises in the exceptional situation of an
59
oppressed or colonial people, discussed below.

-

Despite the Court's remarks about the implications of legality and legitimacy for
recognition at the end of its discussion of the Canadian constitution, when
discussing international law the Court contemplates the possibility that a valid
act of recognition under international law need not be based on the legality and
legitimacy of external self-determination: international law permits the recognition of statehood even where external self-determination is not legal under
international law. The Court notes a trend towards linking recognition to legitimacy, invoking to the EU Guidelines, and refers back to its earlier remarks, but
in the last analysis, its view of the law is that there is no requirement to deny
recognition to a state that is the product of an illegal secession process.6 0 But
the corollary of this - which the Court was equally if not more concerned with
is that the fact of recognition by any given state or group of states cannot be
used to establish a right to statehood in international law. We would draw a
further consequence, based on our fourth notion, concerning continuous and
generalized international responsibility, recognition should not mean (as was
often at least implied or assumed traditionally) endorsement of the struggle for
external self-determination or operate as a justification or excuse for otherwise
internationally wrongful acts committed in that struggle.
One of the most interesting elements in the Canadian Court's opinion on
international law is its discussion of peoplehood. The Court, ostensibly from
judicial economy, refuses to decide whether the Francophone majority of
Quebec constitutes a "people"; this is because, as is discussed presently, the
Court finds that even if it were a "people," it would not have a right to secession
since the only such right, other than in the case of decolonization, is a remedial
right in the case of oppression.
The Court remarked: "much of the Quebec population certainly shares
many of the characteristics (such as a common language and culture) that
would be considered in determining whether a specific group is a 'people,' as
do other groups within Quebec and/or Canada,..." 6 ' This statement must be
understood together with the Court's failure to exclude "border issues" from
the matters that would need to be negotiated as part of a lawful secession
under the Canadian constitution. The claim of the francophone majority or its
political representatives to secession based on the existing boundaries of the
59 Id. para. 112.
60 Id. para. 143.
61 Id. para. 125 (emphasis added).
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province of Quebec would have to be weighed against the claims of other
groups within Quebec who also, and equally, qualify as "peoples" for purposes of self-determination.
The Court's choice not to decide the legal meaning of "people" for purposes
of the right to self-determination in international law is significant. It was
implicitly rejecting a meaning to the right to self-determination that would
give the majority "group" on the territory of a federal sub-unit some kind of
privileged claim to realize independence within those boundaries, while relegating other groups to a lesser status, for example, that of an "ethnic group" in the
Kymlicka typology. A right to external self-determination exists according to the
Canadian Court either in circumstances of colonialism or foreign occupation or
"where a definable group is denied meaningful access to government to pursue
their political, economic, social and cultural development." 6 2 Thus, all but
explicitly, the Canadian Court rejects the ethno-nationalist moral argument for
a right to external self-determination: any definable group could be a "people" if
its members are denied "meaningful access to government to pursue their
political, economic, social and cultural development" on account of group
membership. This justifies the jurisprudential choice of the Canadian Court to
begin by asking whether there was such a denial rather than whether the
francophone majority in Quebec as represented by the Quebec government
was a "people."
The Canadian Court interpreted the meaning of "access to government to
pursue ... political, economic, social and cultural development" not in terms
of the adequacy of the political arrangements to the survival or flourishing of
the defined group as a collectivity, but rather the openness without discrimination of the federal polity's political, economic, and social institutions to
individual members of the defined group. The Canadian court rejected the
argument of the Quebec independence movement that the failure of constitutional amendments enhancing the competences or autonomy of the Quebec
government to represent the collective interests of the Francophone majority
in "their political, economic, social and culture development" as a "group." 6 3
All of the considerations alluded to by the Court go to the extent to which
participation in the life of the country of Canada as a whole, including its
political life, is afforded under the existing arrangements, and none concerned the adequacy of the federal arrangements, above all the competences

62 Id. para. 138.
63 Id. para. 121, citing Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operationin Europe, 14 I.L.
M. 1292 (1975) (Helsinki Final Act).
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of the Quebec government, to allow for the use of collective power to express
the Francophone Quebecois identity.
The Court opined (quoting extensively from an Amicus brief):
The population of Quebec cannot plausibly be said to be denied access to government.
Quebecers occupy prominent positions within the government of Canada. Residents of the
province freely make political choices and pursue economic, social and cultural development within Quebec, across Canada, and throughout the world. The population of Quebec
is equitably represented in legislative, executive and judicial institutions. In short, to
reflect the phraseology of the international documents that address the right to selfdetermination of peoples, Canada is a "sovereign and independent state conducting itself
in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and thus
possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory with64
out distinction."

As can be seen, there is no discussion at all of the extent to which the existence
of a democratic government within a territorial sub-unit of Canada where the
majority is francophone contributes to the realization of the right to self-determination. The Court here seems to have grasped some of the difficulties of
translating the ethno-nationalist moral argument into a workable, coherent
international legal principle. Here we should note the Court's dicta that other
groups within Quebec might equally be "peoples" with a right to self-determination. A Quebec government that privileged the collectivity represented by
Francophone Quebeckers, even if a numerical majority, at the expense of other
groups within the province, might itself engage state responsibility for a violation of the right to self-determination of those other peoples within the territory
of Quebec, understood in terms of democratic equality.
Some years earlier the Canadian Court had held unconstitutional the exercise of competences of the Quebec government to limit the use of English in
public signs in the province, in order to create a "visage linguistique" that
expressed the collective identity of the Francophone majority, finding that
such a policy was a violation of freedom of expression, and not justified as a
limit on rights compatible with a "free and democratic society."6 5 The Quebec
government invoked the override or not-withstanding clause in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms to maintain the sign law in place. But then a
complaint was brought before the United Nations Committee on Civil and
Political Rights, which found that the Quebec law was in violation of

64 Id. para. 136.
65 Fordv. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (strikingdown part of the Charter of the
French Language).
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international human rights norms. 6 As with Sedjic and Finci v. Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the UN Committee opinion in the sign law case illustrates the limits
that international law places on the ability to exercise self-determination in a
manner that advances an ethno-nationalist project by using collective power to
protect a collective identity in ways that affect the rights of others.
The Canadian Court's approach to the legal regulation of external selfdetermination, in addition to displaying clarity about the nature and limits of
the moral arguments underpinning the claim to external self-determination as a
legal entitlement, also is consistent with two of the other notions that we believe
are central to a "comprehensive answer": the notion that any right to external
self-determination needs to be defined in relation to other legal norms and does
not have the character of a "trump" over those norms, as well as the notion of a
continuum of regulation that applies to acts long preceding the recognition of
statehood, as well as responsibility under law after statehood is recognized.
With respect to this last notion, the Canadian court recognized that translating the moral argument from consent into a legal principle required the application of relevant legal norms to the process by which the will of the group in
question to external self-determination is ascertained in the first place. But the
Canadian court also suggests that there is an important issue about the democratic character of any such expression by plebiscite or referendum: thus it
requires "a clear majority" and a "clear question." Also, as the Canadian court
indicates, democracy is much more than a mere crude expression of popular
will. The conditions under which any such expression of will takes place would
be a significant element in the regulation of the exercise of external self-determination and would entail the application of international legal norms concerning freedom of expression and association, political pluralism, and the
meaningful participation of minorities in the voting process. The Badinter
Commission merely assumed that the various plebiscites and resolutions in the
Yugoslav republics were valid democratic acts; Radan makes a powerful argument as to why that was not often the case.
With respect to our fifth notion, that decisions in political and diplomatic
bodies concerning claims of external self-determination do not foreclose the
possibility of the claims of affected persons or groups with no standing before
such bodies, the approach of the Canadian court to justiciability represents
something of a setback. It is understandable that the Court would not want to
micromanage the process by which the political actors negotiated secession or to
have to make an overall judgment about the consistency of the result with the
66 Alan Singer v. Canada, Communication No. 455/1991.
67 PETER RADAN, THE BREAK UP OF YUGOSLAVIA AND INTERNATIONAL LAw
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constitutional and international law principles it enunciated. However, the Court
left the impression that, if the rights of some individual or group were violated
through the failure to respect those principles, no judicial remedy would be
available once the matter was in the hands of the political actors. At the same
time, it is true that a wide variety of individuals and groups whose rights would
arguably be affected by the exercise of external self-determination by the
Francophone majority in Quebec were able to appear before the Supreme
Court as interveners. Also the Court emphasized that whatever might result
from the interplay of the political actors in Canada would be subject to scrutiny
at the international level.

Conclusions
As we noted at the beginning of this article, in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, the
International Court of Justice avoiding completely deciding the question of
whether there is a right to external self-determination in international law and
its limits and conditions. At the same time the Court noted in dicta: "Whether,
outside the context of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien
subjugation, domination and exploitation, the international law of self-determination confers upon part of the population of an existing State a right to
separate from that State, is ... a subject on which radically different views
were expressed by those taking part in the proceedings and expressing a position on the question.",6
Similar differences existed regarding whether international law provides for
a right of "remedial secession" and, if so, in what circumstances. 6 9
These disagreements reflect not only strongly held divergent views about
the question of Kosovo independence but also the serious difficulties entailed in
translating the common moral arguments for a right to external self-determination into workable legal principle of consistent application, and consistent with
other, fundamental norms of international law. At the same time, the international legal regulation of external self-determination has become increasingly
pervasive and comprehensive, even in the absence of clarity about the existence
and extent of a right to external self-determination in international law, whether
through human rights, the application of the law of war to conflicts concerning
self-determination, or international criminal responsibility for actions in

68 Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra note 1, para. 82.
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struggles concerning self-determination such as ethnic cleansing or "persecution." A comprehensive theory of external self-determination in international
law would need to take into account all of these evolving elements: the five
interlocking notions we propose in this article, and which we explore in relation
to recent developments in the law, are intended as a possible beginning point
for the much more challenging task of developing such a theory.

